The 105th

Tuesday, April 29, 2008

A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants,



Local
Bañales shifts bond funds to husband's office
Couple: County must provide space for judge

By Dan Kelley (Contact)
Originally published 03:46 a.m., April 29, 2008
Updated 03:46 a.m., April 29, 2008
Bañales' vote, involvement do not appear to be conflict of interest, attorney says.
Bañales' vote, involvement do not appear to be conflict of interest, attorney says.

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Nueces County Commissioner Peggy Bañales voted to take $118,000 for roadwork in her precinct and spend it inside the courthouse instead -- on a new office for her husband, Judge J. Manuel Bañales.

The judge, who presides over the 105th District Court, had been appointed recently to the additional duty of presiding judge of the 5th Judicial District. In those two capacities, he now maintains two offices in the courthouse.

The Bañaleses said the county was obligated to provide an office for the presiding judge, and that the money would have had to come from somewhere.

"No matter where the money came from, the county would have to do it," Commissioner Bañales said.

The transfer occurred June 13 after Commissioner Bañales abstained from two other votes related to the renovation, one on March 21 and another April 17. She said she wanted to avoid the appearance of conflict of interest.

Behind the scenes however, she worked to secure funding.

And on June 13, when a vote to shift the money for the project came up, she was the second of two commissioners who called to bring the transfer to a vote.

Her vote and involvement do not appear to be a potential conflict of interest, according to the county attorney. Commissioner Bañales also said she voted for the transfer because it contained increased funding for other projects, such as the Richard M. Borchard Regional Fairgrounds.

Of the $165,000 used to renovate the judge's offices, about $118,000, came from 2004 bond funds earmarked to rehabilitate County Road 52 in Precinct 1, which is represented by Commissioner Bañales. Commissioner Betty Jean Longoria contributed about $40,000 from funds she controlled.

Each commissioner maintains a portion of the bond funds to be used in his or her district and each has control over that portion of the funds. Some have more than $1 million dollars left since the county issued the certificates of obligation.

When asked why he needed the second office, Judge Bañales said the county was obligated to provide an office for the presiding judge, and that the money would have had to come from somewhere.

Judge Bañales said he uses the office to have regular meetings with judges from across the region. He also uses the office for a committee that issues credentials for lawyers working in death penalty cases.

Commissioner Bañales said she used money slated for County Road 52 because another bond issue, from 2007, also included money for that road. She said other options to pay for the renovation included using money from the general reserve and taking money away from some other project.

"There was money available," she said. "It seemed that was the best solution."

Judge Bañales said he isn't the first presiding judge to have two offices -- two others who held the post in Edinburg and Brownsville also did.

"You have to keep in mind that the county is obligated to provide those funds, if it was for me or another individual," Judge Bañales said.

The judge estimated that he spends 20 percent to 30 percent of his time serving as presiding judge. Duties of that post include assigning cases to other judges in situations where another judge is ill or incapacitated, and presiding over situations in which a party in a lawsuit has asked a judge to step aside or recuse himself or herself from a case.

Judge Bañales also sits on the bench for civil and criminal trials in both Nueces and Kleberg counties.

The office has a kitchen, bathroom, and a large conference room where judges from several counties meet regularly.

Commissioner Bañales' vote likely is not a conflict of interest under Texas law. County officials generally are prohibited from voting on matters in which their close relatives have a financial or business interest, and this situation likely doesn't add up to a financial or business interest, County Attorney Laura Garza Jimenez said.

Bañales was appointed to a four-year term as presiding judge in January 2007.

He is the first judge from Nueces County to hold that post in more than 20 years.

Initially, Judge Bañales asked to house his new offices on the 10th floor of the courthouse, where the 13th Court of Appeals meets. He wanted to use office space the court of appeals wasn't using.

The Court of Appeals had other ideas.

A letter signed by six justices complained that locating Bañales on the 10th floor could allow visitors to his office to overhear the court's deliberations. It also would have ejected some of the court of appeals' staff.

By March, Judge Bañales had agreed to offices on the fifth floor.

Contact Dan Kelley at 886-4316 or kelleyd@caller.com.

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Thursday, April 17, 2008

A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants,

Anderson County courthouse Jim Wells Wharton County courthouse
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Code of Judicial Conduct
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Judicial Ethics | Judicial Conduct | Judicial Office | Judicial Ethics Opinions | Texas Ethics Commission

* Canon 1 A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary.
* Canon 2 A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All Activities.
* Canon 3 A Judge Should Perform the Duties of Office Impartially and Diligently.
* Canon 4 A Judge May Conduct the Judge's Extra-Judicial Activities to Minimize the Risk of Conflict with Judicial Obligations.
* Canon 5 A Judge Should Refrain From Inappropriate Political Activity.
* Canon 6 A Judge Shall Comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct.
* Canon 7 Effective Date of Compliance
* Canon 8 Construction and Terminology of the Code.

Preamble

Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us. The role of the judiciary is central to American concepts of justice and the rule of law. Intrinsic to all sections of this Code of Judicial Conduct are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system.The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution of disputes and a highly visible symbol of government under the rule of law.

The Code of Judicial Conduct is not intended as an exhaustive guide for the conduct of judges.They should also be governed in their judicial and personal conduct by general ethical standards.The Code is intended, however, to state basic standards which should govern the conduct of all judges and to provide guidance to assist judges in establishing and maintaining high standards of judicial and personal conduct.
CANON 1
Upholding the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary

An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards of conduct, and should personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary is preserved.The provisions of this Code are to be construed and applied to further that objective.
CANON 2
Avoiding Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety In All of the Judge's Activities

A. A judge shall comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

B. A judge shall not allow any relationship to influence judicial conduct or judgment A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. A judge shall not testify voluntarily as a character witness.

C. A judge shall not knowingly hold membership in any organization that practices discrimination prohibited by law.

CANON 3
Performing the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently

A. Judicial Duties in General. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all the judge's other activities. Judicial duties include all the duties of the judge's office prescribed by law.In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply:

B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.

(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is required or recusal is appropriate.

(2) A judge should be faithful to the law and shall maintain professional competence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.

(3) A judge shall require order and decorum in proceedings before the judge.

(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control.

(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice.

(6) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not knowingly permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to do so.

(7) A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status against parties, witnesses, counsel or others.This requirement does not preclude legitimate advocacy when any of these factors is an issue in the proceeding.

(8) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications or other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties between the judge and a party, an attorney, a guardian or attorney ad litem, an alternative dispute resolution neutral, or any other court appointee concerning the merits of a pending or impending judicial proceeding. A judge shall require compliance with this subsection by court personnel subject to the judge's direction and control.This subsection does not prohibit:

(a) communications concerning uncontested administrative or uncontested procedural matters;

(b) conferring separately with the parties and/or their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters, provided, however, that the judge shall first give notice to all parties and not thereafter hear any contested matters between the parties except with the consent of all parties;

(c) obtaining the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the judge if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond;

(d) consulting with other judges or with court personnel;

(e) considering an ex parte communication expressly authorized by law.

(9) A judge should dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly.

(10) A judge shall abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding which may come before the judge's court in a manner which suggests to a reasonable person the judge's probable decision on any particular case. This prohibition applies to any candidate for judicial office, with respect to judicial proceedings pending or impending in the court on which the candidate would serve if elected. A judge shall require similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to the judge's direction and control.This section does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court.This section does not apply to proceedings in which the judge or judicial candidate is a litigant in a personal capacity.

(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for any purpose unrelated to judicial duties, nonpublic information acquired in a judicial capacity.The discussions, votes, positions taken, and writings of appellate judges and court personnel about causes are confidences of the court and shall be revealed only through a court's judgment, a written opinion or in accordance with Supreme Court guidelines for a court approved history project.

C. Administrative Responsibilities.

(1) A judge should diligently and promptly discharge the judge's administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice and maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and should cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration of court business.

(2) A judge should require staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice in the performance of their official duties.

(3) A judge with supervisory authority for the judicial performance of other judges should take reasonable measures to assure the prompt disposition of matters before them and the proper performance of their other judicial responsibilities.

(4) A judge shall not make unnecessary appointments. A judge shall exercise the power of appointment impartially and on the basis of merit. A judge shall avoid nepotism and favoritism. A judge shall not approve compensation of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.

(5) A judge shall not fail to comply with Rule 12 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, knowing that the failure to comply is in violation of the rule.

D. Disciplinary Responsibilities.

(1) A judge who receives information clearly establishing that another judge has committed a violation of this Code should take appropriate action. A judge having knowledge that another judge has committed a violation of this Code that raises a substantial question as to the other judge's fitness for office shall inform the State Commission on Judicial Conduct or take other appropriate action.

(2) A judge who receives information clearly establishing that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct should take appropriate action. A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Texas or take other appropriate action.

CANON 4
Conducting the Judge's Extra-Judicial Activities to Minimize the Risk of Conflict with Judicial Obligations

A. Extra-Judicial Activities in General. A judge shall conduct all of the judge's extra-judicial activities so that they do not:

(1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge; or

(2) interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.

B. Activities to Improve the Law. A judge may:

(1) speak, write, lecture, teach and participate in extra-judicial activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of justice and non-legal subjects, subject to the requirements of this Code; and,

(2) serve as a member, officer, or director of an organization or governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. A judge may assist such an organization in raising funds and may participate in their management and investment, but should not personally participate in public fund raising activities.He or she may make recommendations to public and private fund-granting agencies on projects and programs concerning the law, the legal system and the administration of justice.

C. Civic or Charitable Activities. A judge may participate in civic and charitable activities that do not reflect adversely upon the judge's impartiality or interfere with the performance of judicial duties. A judge may serve as an officer, director, trustee or non-legal advisor of an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization not conducted for the profit of its members, subject to the following limitations:

(1) A judge should not serve if it is likely that the organization will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge or will be regularly or frequently engaged in adversary proceedings in any court.

(2) A judge shall not solicit funds for any educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization, but may be listed as an officer, director, delegate, or trustee of such an organization, and may be a speaker or a guest of honor at an organization's fund raising events.

(3) A judge should not give investment advice to such an organization, but may serve on its board of directors or trustees even though it has the responsibility for approving investment decisions.

D. Financial Activities.

(1) A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the judge's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of the judicial duties, exploit his or her judicial position, or involve the judge in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court on which the judge serves.This limitation does not prohibit either a judge or candidate from soliciting funds for appropriate campaign or officeholder expenses as permitted by state law.

(2) Subject to the requirements of subsection (1), a judge may hold and manage investments, including real estate, and engage in other remunerative activity including the operation of a business. A judge shall not be an officer, director or manager of a publicly owned business.For purposes of this Canon, a "publicly owned business" is a business having more than ten owners who are not related to the judge by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree of relationship.

(3) A judge should manage any investments and other economic interests to minimize the number of cases in which the judge is disqualified.As soon as the judge can do so without serious financial detriment, the judge should divest himself or herself of investments and other economic interests that might require frequent disqualification. A judge shall be informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic interests, and make a reasonable effort to be informed about the personal economic interests of any family member residing in the judge's household.

(4) Neither a judge nor a family member residing in the judge's household shall accept a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from anyone except as follows:

(a) a judge may accept a gift incident to a public testimonial to the judge; books and other resource materials supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis for official use; or an invitation to the judge and spouse to attend a bar-related function or activity devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice;

(b) a judge or a family member residing in the judge's household may accept ordinary social hospitality; a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from a relative; a gift from a friend for a special occasion such as a wedding, engagement, anniversary, or birthday, if the gift is fairly commensurate with the occasion and the relationship; a loan from a lending institution in its regular course of business on the same terms generally available to persons who are not judges; or a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms applied to other applicants;

(c) a judge or a family member residing in the judge's household may accept any other gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if the donor is not a party or person whose interests have come or are likely to come before the judge;

(d) a gift, award or benefit incident to the business, profession or other separate activity of a spouse or other family member residing in the judge's household, including gifts, awards and benefits for the use of both the spouse or other family member and the judge (as spouse or family member), provided the gift, award or benefit could not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties.

E. Fiduciary Activities.

(1) A judge shall not serve as executor, administrator or other personal representative, trustee, guardian, attorney in fact or other fiduciary, except for the estate, trust or person of a member of the judge's family, and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.

(2) A judge shall not serve as a fiduciary if it is likely that the judge as a fiduciary will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, or if the estate, trust, or ward becomes involved in adversary proceedings in the court on which the judge serves or one under its appellate jurisdiction.

(3) The same restrictions on financial activities that apply to a judge personally also apply to the judge while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

F. Service as Arbitrator or Mediator. An active full-time judge shall not act as an arbitrator or mediator for compensation outside the judicial system, but a judge may encourage settlement in the performance of official duties.

G. Practice of Law. A judge shall not practice law except as permitted by statute or this Code. Notwithstanding this prohibition, a judge may act pro se and may, without compensation, give legal advice to and draft or review documents for a member of the judge's family.

H. Extra-Judicial Appointments. Except as otherwise provided by constitution and statute, a judge should not accept appointment to a governmental committee, commission, or other position that is concerned with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. A judge, however, may represent his or her country, state, or locality on ceremonial occasions or in connection with historical, educational, and cultural activities.

I. Compensation, Reimbursement and Reporting.

(1) Compensation and Reimbursement. A judge may receive compensation and reimbursement of expenses for the extra-judicial activities permitted by this Code, if the source of such payments does not give the appearance of influencing the judge's performance of judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of impropriety.

(a) Compensation shall not exceed a reasonable amount nor shall it exceed what a person who is not a judge would receive for the same activity.

(b) Expense reimbursement shall be limited to the actual cost of travel, food, and lodging reasonably incurred by the judge and, where appropriate to the occasion, by the judge's family.Any payment in excess of such an amount is compensation.

(2) Public Reports. A judge shall file financial and other reports as required by law.

CANON 5
Refraining From Inappropriate Political Activity

(1) A judge or judicial candidate shall not:

(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office regarding pending or impending cases, specific classes of cases, specific classes of litigants, or specific propositions of law that would suggest to a reasonable person that the judge is predisposed to a probable decision in cases within the scope of the pledge;

(ii) knowingly or recklessly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent; or

(iii) make a statement that would violate Canon 3B(10).

(2) A judge or judicial candidate shall not authorize the public use of his or her name endorsing another candidate for any public office, except that either may indicate support for a political party. A judge or judicial candidate may attend political events and express his or her views on political matters in accord with this Canon and Canon 3B(10).

(3) A judge shall resign from judicial office upon becoming a candidate in a contested election for a non-judicial office either in a primary or in a general or in a special election. A judge may continue to hold judicial office while being a candidate for election to or serving as a delegate in a state constitutional convention or while being a candidate for election to any judicial office.

(4) A judge or judicial candidate subject to the Judicial Campaign Fairness Act, Tex. Elec. Code §253.151, et seq. (the “Act”), shall not knowingly commit an act for which he or she knows the Act imposes a penalty. Contributions returned in accordance with Sections 253.155(e), 253.157(b) or 253.160(b) of the Act are not a violation of this paragraph.

COMMENT

A statement made during a campaign for judicial office, whether or not prohibited by this Canon, may cause a judge's impartiality to be reasonably questioned in the context of a particular case and may result in recusal.
CANON 6
Compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct

A. The following persons shall comply with all provisions of this Code:

(1) An active, full-time justice or judge of one of the following courts:

(a) the Supreme Court,

(b) the Court of Criminal Appeals,

(c) courts of appeals,

(d) district courts,

(e) criminal district courts, and

(f) statutory county courts.

(2) A full-time commissioner, master, magistrate, or referee of a court listed in (1) above.

B. A County Judge who performs judicial functions shall comply with all provisions of this Code except the judge is not required to comply:

(1) when engaged in duties which relate to the judge's role in the administration of the county;

(2) with Canons 4D(2), 4D(3), or 4H;

(3) with Canon 4G, except practicing law in the court on which he or she serves or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the county court, or acting as a lawyer in a proceeding in which he or she has served as a judge or in any proceeding related thereto.

(4) with Canon 5(3).

C. Justices of the Peace and Municipal Court Judges.

(1) A justice of the peace or municipal court judge shall comply with all provisions of this Code, except the judge is not required to comply:

(a) with Canon 3B(8) pertaining to ex parte communications; in lieu thereof a justice of the peace or municipal court judge shall comply with 6C(2) below;

(b) with Canons 4D(2), 4D(3), 4E, or 4H;

(c) with Canon 4F, unless the court on which the judge serves may have jurisdiction of the matter or parties involved in the arbitration or mediation; or

(d) if an attorney, with Canon 4G, except practicing law in the court on which he or she serves, or acting as a lawyer in a proceeding in which he or she has served as a judge or in any proceeding related thereto.

(e) with Canons 5(3).

(2) A justice of the peace or a municipal court judge, except as authorized by law, shall not directly or indirectly initiate, permit, nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning the merits of a pending judicial proceeding.This subsection does not prohibit communications concerning:

(a) uncontested administrative matters,

(b) uncontested procedural matters,

(c) magistrate duties and functions,

(d) determining where jurisdiction of an impending claim or dispute may lie,

(e) determining whether a claim or dispute might more appropriately be resolved in some other judicial or non-judicial forum,

(f) mitigating circumstances following a plea of nolo contendere or guilty for a fine-only offense, or

(g) any other matters where ex parte communications are contemplated or authorized by law.

D. A Part-time commissioner, master, magistrate, or referee of a court listed in 6A(1) above:

(1) shall comply with all provisions of this Code, except he or she is not required to comply with Canons 4D(2), 4E, 4F, 4G or 4H, and

(2) should not practice law in the court which he or she serves or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the court which he or she serves, or act as a lawyer in a proceeding in which he or she has served as a commissioner, master, magistrate, or referee, or in any other proceeding related thereto.

E. A Judge Pro Tempore, while acting as such:

(1) shall comply with all provisions of this Code applicable to the court on which he or she is serving, except he or she is not required to comply with Canons 4D(2), 4D(3), 4E, 4F,4G or 4H, and

(2) after serving as a judge pro tempore, should not act as a lawyer in a proceeding in which he or she has served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.

F. A Senior Judge, or a former appellate or district judge, or a retired or former statutory county court judge who has consented to be subject to assignment as a judicial officer:

(1) shall comply with all the provisions of this Code except he or she is not required to comply with Canon 4D(2),4E, 4F,4G, or 4H, but

(2) should refrain from judicial service during the period of an extra-judicial appointment not permitted by Canon 4H.

G. Candidates for Judicial Office.

(1) Any person seeking elective judicial office listed in Canon 6A(1) shall be subject to the same standards of Canon 5 that are required of members of the judiciary.

(2) Any judge who violates this Code shall be subject to sanctions by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct.

(3) Any lawyer who is a candidate seeking judicial office who violates Canon 5 or other relevant provisions of this Code is subject to disciplinary action by the State Bar of Texas.

(4) The conduct of any other candidate for elective judicial office, not subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of this section, who violates Canon 5 or other relevant provisions of the Code is subject to review by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, or the local District Attorney for appropriate action.

H. Attorneys.

Any lawyer who contributes to the violation of Canons 3B(7), 3B(10), 4D(4), 5, or 6C(2), or other relevant provisions of this Code, is subject to disciplinary action by the State Bar of Texas.

CANON 7
Effective Date of Compliance

A person to whom this Code becomes applicable should arrange his or her affairs as soon as reasonably possible to comply with it.
CANON 8
Construction and Terminology of the Code

A. Construction.

The Code of Judicial Conduct is intended to establish basic standards for ethical conduct of judges.It consists of specific rules set forth in Sections under broad captions called Canons.

The Sections are rules of reason, which should be applied consistent with constitutional requirements, statutes, other court rules and decisional law and in the context of all relevant circumstances.The Code is to be construed so as not to impinge on the essential independence of judges in making judicial decisions.

The Code is designed to provide guidance to judges and candidates for judicial office and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through the State Commission on Judicial Conduct.It is not designed or intended as a basis for civil liability or criminal prosecution. Furthermore, the purpose of the Code would be subverted if the Code were invoked by lawyers for mere tactical advantage in a proceeding.

It is not intended, however, that every transgression will result in disciplinary action. Whether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the degree of discipline to be imposed, should be determined through a reasonable and reasoned application of the text and should depend on such factors as the seriousness of the transgression, whether there is a pattern of improper activity and the effect of the improper activity on others or on the judicial system.

B. Terminology.

(1) "Shall" or "shall not" denotes binding obligations the violation of which can result in disciplinary action.

(2) "Should" or "should not" relates to aspirational goals and as a statement of what is or is not appropriate conduct but not as a binding rule under which a judge may be disciplined.

(3) "May" denotes permissible discretion or, depending on the context, refers to action that is not covered by specific proscriptions.

(4) "De minimis" denotes an insignificant interest that could not raise reasonable question as to a judge's impartiality.

(5) "Economic interest" denotes ownership of a more than de minimis legal or equitable interest,or a relationship as officer, director, advisor or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

(i) ownership of an interest in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not an economic interest in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund or a proceeding pending or impending before the judge could substantially affect the value of the interest;

(ii) service by a judge as an officer, director, advisor or other active participant, in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization or service by a judge's spouse, parent or child as an officer, director, advisor or other active participant in any organization does not create an economic interest in securities held by that organization;

(iii) a deposit in a financial institution, the proprietary interest of a policy holder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association or of a member in a credit union, or a similar proprietary interest, is not an economic interest in the organization unless a proceeding pending or impending before the judge could substantially affect the value of the interest; and

(iv) ownership of government securities is not an economic interest in the issuer unless a proceeding pending or impending before the judge could substantially affect the value of the securities.

(6) "Fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian.

(7) "Knowingly," "knowledge," "known" or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.

(8) "Law" denotes court rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions and decisional law.

(9) "Member of the judge's (or the candidate's) family" denotes a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative or person with whom the candidate maintains a close familial relationship.

(10) "Family member residing in the judge's household" means any relative of a judge by blood or marriage, or a person treated by a judge as a member of the judge's family, who resides at the judge's household.

(11) "Require." The rules prescribing that a judge "require" certain conduct of others are, like all of the rules in this Code, rules of reason.The use of the term "require" in that context means a judge is to exercise reasonable direction and control over the conduct of those persons subject to the judge's direction and control.

(12) "Third degree of relationship."The following persons are relatives within the third degree of relationship: great-grandparent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, great-grandchild, nephew or niece.

(13) "Retired Judge" means a person who receives from the Texas Judicial Retirement System, Plan One or Plan Two, an annuity based on service that was credited to the system.(Secs. 831.001 and 836.001,V.T.C.A. Government Code [Ch. 179, Sec. 1, 71st Legislature (1989)]

(14) "Senior Judge" means a retired appellate or district judge who has consented to be subject to assignment pursuant to Section 75.001, Government Code. [Ch. 359, 69th Legislature, Reg. Session (1985)]

(15) "Statutory County Court Judge" means the judge of a county court created by the legislature under Article V, Section 1, of the Texas Constitution, including county courts at law, statutory probate courts, county criminal courts, county criminal courts of appeals, and county civil courts at law. (Sec. 21.009, V.T.C.A. Government Code [Ch. 2, Sec. 1601(18), 71st Legislature (1989)])

(16) "County Judge" means the judge of the county court created in each county by Article V, Section 15, of the Texas Constitution.(Sec. 21.009, V.T.C.A. Government Code [Ch. 2, Sec. 1601(18), 71st Legislature (1989)])

(17) "Part-time" means service on a continuing or periodic basis, but with permission by law to devote time to some other profession or occupation and for which the compensation for that reason is less than that for full-time service.

(18) "Judge Pro Tempore" means a person who is appointed to act temporarily as a judge.

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Updated: 30-Jan-2007

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Monday, March 17, 2008

Rule 1.06 notes that "[i]f the lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in question, it may be difficult for the lawyer to give a client detached advi


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OPINION 571

THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS

May 2006

QUESTION PRESENTED

Under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, may a prosecutor require as part of a plea agreement that a criminal defendant waive post-conviction appeals based on prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel?

Is it permissible under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct for a criminal defendant's lawyer to advise the defendant regarding such an agreement, and if agreed to by the defendant, to sign the plea agreement along with the defendant?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In the context of negotiating a plea agreement with a criminal defendant, and as a condition to the prosecutor's acceptance of the plea agreement, the prosecutor requires the criminal defendant to execute an agreement waiving post-conviction rights to appeal based on prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, the prosecutor requires the criminal defendant's lawyer to sign the plea agreement containing these waivers of post-conviction rights to appeal.

DISCUSSION

The questions presented relate to numerous legal issues that may be involved in the enforceability and effect of waivers contained in plea agreements but that are not within the jurisdiction of the Committee. Because of the limited jurisdiction of the Committee, this opinion is necessarily limited to consideration of the applicability of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct to the circumstances presented.

Prosecutor

Rule 3.09 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct sets forth certain ethical standards for prosecutors in criminal cases. Rule 3.09(c) states that the prosecutor in a criminal case shall "not initiate or encourage efforts to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pre-trial, trial or post-trial rights" (emphasis added). By its terms, Rule 3.09(c) prohibits a prosecutor from attempting to obtain a waiver of post-conviction rights from a criminal defendant who is not represented by counsel. In contrast, the criminal defendant in the circumstances here considered is and has been represented by counsel. In these circumstances, Rule 3.09 does not prohibit a prosecutor from requesting in a plea agreement a waiver of appeals based on prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel.

Paragraphs (a) and (d) of Rule 3.09 provide that a prosecutor shall:
    "(a) refrain from prosecuting . . . a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause; . . .

    (d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; . . . ."
A violation of these requirements can constitute prosecutorial misconduct. While Rule 3.09 does not prohibit a prosecutor from including in a plea agreement a waiver of post-conviction appeals based on claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel, obtaining such a waiver in a plea agreement does not relieve the prosecutor from complying with the requirements of Rule 3.09. Further, the waiver does not exempt the prosecutor from disciplinary action for misconduct that violates the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

Defense Counsel

The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct impose on defense counsel no special constraints with respect to representation of a criminal defendant concerning a proposed plea agreement containing a waiver of appeals based on claims of misconduct by the prosecutor. However, with respect to a proposed waiver of appeals based on claims of ineffective assistance of the defendant's counsel, the requirements of Rule 1.08(g) and Rules 1.06(b) and 1.06(c) as applied to defense counsel must be considered.

Rule 1.08(g) provides in pertinent part that "[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement . . . ." A plea agreement waiving post-conviction appeals based on ineffective assistance of counsel does not expressly limit the defense counsel's liability to the defendant for malpractice. Rather, the waiver is directed at arguments that might be made, on direct appeal, by habeas corpus or otherwise, in an effort by the criminal defendant to set aside the plea agreement and thus the conviction. Nevertheless, depending on the precise language of the plea agreement and the specific facts of a particular case, an attempt could be made to use or interpret the plea agreement waiver of rights to appeal based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as an agreed limitation on defense counsel's liability for malpractice. In this opinion, the Committee assumes that in a malpractice dispute, upon a consideration of the relevant public policy concerns arising from the circumstances surrounding plea agreements and the nature of the relationship between a criminal defendant and criminal defense counsel, a court or other authority would not allow a waiver in the plea agreement to be used or interpreted as an agreement limiting a defendant's malpractice claim. Consequently, the Committee finds that Rule 1.08(g) does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a defendant regarding a plea agreement waiver of post-conviction appeals based on ineffective assistance of counsel. However, if such a plea agreement waiver were interpreted to be an agreement limiting a criminal defense lawyer's liability to the defendant for malpractice, Rule 1.08(g) would require that the criminal defendant be represented by separate counsel, at least with respect to considering and entering into the waiver relating to ineffective assistance of counsel.

Advising a defendant about a plea agreement that waives post-conviction appeals based on claims that the criminal defendant's lawyer rendered ineffective assistance would normally present for the lawyer conflict of interest issues that are governed by Rules 1.06(b) and 1.06(c). These Rules provide in pertinent part:
    "(b) . . . except to the extent permitted by paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a person if the representation of that person: . . .

    (2) reasonably appears to be or become adversely limited . . . by the lawyer's or law firm's own interests.

    (c) A lawyer may represent a client in the circumstances described in (b) if:
      (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation of each client will not be materially affected; and

      (2) each affected or potentially affected client consents to such representation after full disclosure of the existence, nature, implications, and possible adverse consequences of the common representation and the advantages involved, if any."
Depending upon the facts involved in each case, a criminal defense lawyer may or may not have a conflict of interest with respect to advising the defendant about a plea agreement containing a waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In some cases, the defense lawyer may have no cause for any reasonable concern as to his effectiveness in representing the defendant. In such cases, the representation of the defendant as to the waiver would not reasonably appear to be adversely limited by the lawyer's interests; consequently, Rule 1.06(b)(2) would not prohibit the lawyer's representation of the defendant as to the waiver.

In other cases, if the lawyer has a reasonable basis for concern that he may have rendered ineffective assistance to the defendant, the lawyer's representation of the defendant as to the proposed plea agreement waiver may reasonably appear to be limited by the lawyer's own interest in not being found to have rendered ineffective assistance. Rule 1.06(b)(2) would then prohibit the lawyer's representation as to the waiver unless the requirements of Rule 1.06(c) can be met. In that circumstance, the lawyer would have to apply Rule 1.06(c)(1) and determine whether he reasonably believes that the representation of the defendant with respect to the plea agreement and waiver would not be adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests. In this regard, Comment 5 to Rule 1.06 notes that "[i]f the lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in question, it may be difficult for the lawyer to give a client detached advice." In some instances, a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the defendant should not agree to the lawyer's representation with respect to the proposed plea agreement waiver, in which case the lawyer should not ask for the defendant's consent to continue the representation as to the waiver. See Comment 7 to Rule 1.06.

In other circumstances, following a determination that the requirements of Rule 1.06(c) apply, the lawyer may reasonably believe after examination of the issue that the representation of the defendant as to the proposed plea agreement waiver will not be materially affected by the lawyer's own interests. In that case, Rule 1.06(c)(2) requires the lawyer to seek the consent of the defendant for the lawyer's representation concerning the waiver after full disclosure to the defendant of the facts and issues involved. In disclosure on this matter and in communications with the defendant generally, the lawyer is required under Rule 1.03(b) to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." In some cases, although the lawyer reasonably believes under Rule 1.06(c)(1) that the representation of the defendant will not be materially affected, it may be impossible to make the required full disclosure or to obtain informed consent from the defendant. For example, a lawyer may not be able to make the necessary disclosure because of duties owed to other clients, or the defendant may for some reason be unable to consider appropriately the question of giving consent after the lawyer's disclosure. In cases where consent after full disclosure is required but for whatever reason cannot be obtained, defense counsel may not advise the defendant as to a plea agreement waiver of appeals based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

In summary, a criminal defense lawyer must consider the application of Rule 1.06 in each case involving a plea agreement waiver of post-conviction appeals based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In some cases, the criminal defense lawyer will be able to determine that there is no concern on the part of the lawyer as to the effectiveness of the lawyer's assistance to the defendant that would create a conflict of interest for the lawyer under Rule 1.06(b)(2). In that event, the lawyer may represent the defendant with respect to the plea agreement waiver. In other cases, the representation will be permitted after the lawyer's evaluation under Rule 1.06(c)(1) and disclosure and consent under Rule 1.06(c)(2). In other cases, a conflict of interest will exist within the scope of Rule 1.06(b)(2) and it will not be possible for the lawyer to meet the requirements of Rule 1.06(c). In that event, the defendant must be advised by separate counsel concerning the proposed waiver of post-conviction appeals based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

CONCLUSION

The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct do not prohibit a prosecutor from including in a plea agreement a waiver of post-conviction appeals based on claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel. However, obtaining such a waiver does not relieve the prosecutor from complying with the requirements of Rule 3.09 and does not preclude discipline for misconduct that violates the Texas Disciplinary Rules.

Assuming that a waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a plea agreement is not treated as an agreed limitation on possible future malpractice claims by the defendant against the lawyer, the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct do not prohibit a criminal defense lawyer from advising a defendant with respect to a plea agreement that contains a waiver of post-conviction appeals based on prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel or from signing the plea agreement along with the defendant, provided that in the particular case the defense lawyer fully complies with the applicable requirements of Rules 1.06(b) and 1.06(c) with respect to any conflict of interest arising from the waiver of post-conviction appeals based on ineffective assistance of counsel.


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Tuesday, January 01, 2008

Maybe the pervs should "get stoned"?

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Published on Monday, May 28, 2001 in the San Francisco Chronicle
'Perv Onboard'
There is a Reason Why the Practice of Branding Criminals was Abandoned Centuries Ago
by Harley Sorensen

Why are all the best ideas coming out of Texas these days?

Ten days ago, a brilliant judge in Corpus Christi called about 55 registered sex offenders before him and abruptly changed the terms of their probation. He ordered 21 of them to put signs in their yards that read: "Danger! Registered Sex Offender Lives Here."

District Judge J. Manuel Banales also ordered the group to put bumper stickers on their cars reading: "Danger! Registered Sex Offender in Vehicle."

Wow! An updated version of the "scarlet letter." How novel. How progressive. Judge Banales's treatment ought to cut down sex crimes even more than registration of known sex offenders did. Or various Megan's Laws. Or Three Strikes laws.

But did the judge go far enough? Most sex offenders work. Shouldn't they also have signs placed at their workplace: "Caution. Sex offender washing dishes here"?

And they are notoriously religious. How about signs in front of their churches? "Take heed! Sex offender worshipping herein."

The gaps in Judge Banales's order are obvious.

Wouldn't it help of all sex offenders were required to wear distinctive clothing? My first instinct is to put the really weird ones in long, black, flowing robes, but that outfit has already been taken. How about pink bunny rabbit suits with Dr. Suess hats?

This is such a good idea it should be extended.

It doesn't seem fair to the rest of us that burglars aren't identified by warning signs. Wouldn't you be more careful about locking all your doors and windows and setting the alarm if you knew a burglar lived next door? Burglars need yard signs.

How about bad check writers? Is it fair to anyone trusting enough to take a check to not have the scam artist plainly identified in advance? Perhaps they should have c-h-e-k f-o-r-g-e-r tattooed across their knuckles.

Knowing the scourge of drugs in our communities (in spite of our government's valiant efforts in Peru to eradicate them), drug offenders' homes also should be clearly identified, lest an unsuspecting passer-by be stricken by an escaping puff of marijuana smoke, thus rendering him simultaneously silly and hungry.

By all means the homes of convicted prostitutes should be clearly marked, perhaps by means of a red light, so that staunch upright citizens (like myself, for instance) would know to walk on the other side of the street to avoid being lured unsuspectingly into unwanted and costly debauchery.

Ah, that Judge Banales is a genius. If only he would have taken the next step.

I have given this subject deep and prayerful consideration, and it seems to me that the yard-sign warnings should not be restricted to the homes of convicted criminals.

People in a civilized society should be given some clue, for instance, when they are approaching the presence of a registered politician. Or a district court judge of the caliber of J. Manuel Banales.

This is on the plus side, mind you. If you and I knew where politicians lived, if their homes were properly marked, we might be able to visit with them without first making sizable campaign contributions.

Police officers also should have their homes properly identified. What if there's a crime? To whom should you run for help, the cop up the block or the widow across the alley?

The cop, of course. But how can you, if you don't know he or she is there?

When it comes down to it, everybody should be identified by yard sign, uniform, tattoo, or whatever it takes. Wouldn't life be less complicated if, as you walked down the street, you could tell who lived in every house? Student. Hooker. Plumber. Retiree. Millionaire. Ne'er-do-well. Sex offender. Bank guard. Editor. Venture capitalist. Lawyer. Bus driver. Chronic liar. Politician.

Now I'm repeating myself.

SERIOUSLY, FOLKS ... in the off chance that Judge Banales is genuinely trying to protect children rather than make political hay, his order is of the type that seems good at first glance but has hidden negative consequences.

Most importantly, it will encourage vigilantism. Sex offenders are easy marks to begin with. Who likes them? They're quite often timid. Forcing these pathetic souls to humiliate themselves is sadistic and certainly invites trouble.

There is a reason why the practice of branding criminals was abandoned centuries ago.

In this case, the yard sign will hurt everybody who lives in the house, not just the convicted sex offender. And we can only imagine what it will do to real estate values. Would you buy a house next door to one with a sex-offender sign in front?

Contrary to popular belief, most convicted sex offenders are not of the compulsive type and do not repeat their crimes. If they did, our prisons would be jam-packed with sex offenders of advanced age. They are not.

The compulsive type should, if properly convicted, be locked up and given serious treatment. Unfortunately, our society hasn't shown any inclination that it really wants to "cure" compulsive sex offenders.

We either lock them up with no treatment at all or we put them in two-bit programs that are almost guaranteed to fail.

Our real concern is with child molesters, who are usually weak personalities who don't deal well with adults. Making them the objects of continued public ridicule and scorn helps no one.

The real danger with Judge Banales's order is that it might encourage the next molester to kill his victim to avoid the humiliation of getting caught. Polly Klass would probably be alive today if the man who kidnapped and killed her, Richard Allen Davis, wasn't terrified of getting caught and being returned to prison as a "baby raper."

We should never tolerate child molesters in our communities, but we should remember that, in the long run, draconian remedies create draconian criminals.

Our goal should be a safer society. Bullying weak men doesn't achieve that goal.

Harley Sorensen is a longtime journalist and iconoclast. His column appears Mondays.

©2001 SF Gate

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Wednesday, October 31, 2007

when you teach that those who differ from you threaten your freedom or your job or your family, then you also learn to confront others......

This is a time of shame and sorrow. It is not a day for politics. I have saved this one opportunity, my only event of today, to speak briefly to you about the mindless menace of violence in America which again stains our land and every one of our lives. It is not the concern of any one race. The victims of the violence are black and white, rich and poor, young and old, famous and unknown. They are, most important of all, human beings whom other human beings loved and needed. No one - no matter where he lives or what he does - can be certain who will suffer from some senseless act of bloodshed. And yet it goes on and on and on in this country of ours. Why? What has violence ever accomplished? What has it ever created? No martyr's cause has ever been stilled by an assassin's bullet. No wrongs have ever been righted by riots and civil disorders. A sniper is only a coward, not a hero; and an uncontrolled, uncontrollable mob is only the voice of madness, not the voice of reason. Whenever any American's life is taken by another American unnecessarily - whether it is done in the name of the law or in the defiance of the law, by one man or a gang, in cold blood or in passion, in an attack of violence or in response to violence - whenever we tear at the fabric of the life which another man has painfully and clumsily woven for himself and his children, the whole nation is degraded. "Among free men," said Abraham Lincoln, "there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet; and those who take such appeal are sure to lose their cause and pay the costs." Yet we seemingly tolerate a rising level of violence that ignores our common humanity and our claims to civilization alike. We calmly accept newspaper reports of civilian slaughter in far-off lands. We glorify killing on movie and television screens and call it entertainment. We make it easy for men of all shades of sanity to acquire whatever weapons and ammunition they desire. Too often we honor swagger and bluster and wielders of force; too often we excuse those who are willing to build their own lives on the shattered dreams of others. Some Americans who preach non-violence abroad fail to practice it here at home. Some who accuse others of inciting riots have by their own conduct invited them. Some look for scapegoats, others look for conspiracies, but this much is clear: violence breeds violence, repression brings retaliation, and only a cleansing of our whole society can remove this sickness from our soul. For there is another kind of violence, slower but just as deadly destructive as the shot or the bomb in the night. This is the violence of institutions; indifference and inaction and slow decay. This is the violence that afflicts the poor, that poisons relations between men because their skin has different colors. This is the slow destruction of a child by hunger, and schools without books and homes without heat in the winter. This is the breaking of a man's spirit by denying him the chance to stand as a father and as a man among other men. And this too afflicts us all. I have not come here to propose a set of specific remedies nor is there a single set. For a broad and adequate outline we know what must be done. When you teach a man to hate and fear his brother, when you teach that he is a lesser man because of his color or his beliefs or the policies he pursues, when you teach that those who differ from you threaten your freedom or your job or your family, then you also learn to confront others not as fellow citizens but as enemies, to be met not with cooperation but with conquest; to be subjugated and mastered. We learn, at the last, to look at our brothers as aliens, men with whom we share a city, but not a community; men bound to us in common dwelling, but not in common effort. We learn to share only a common fear, only a common desire to retreat from each other, only a common impulse to meet disagreement with force. For all this, there are no final answers. Yet we know what we must do. It is to achieve true justice among our fellow citizens. The question is not what programs we should seek to enact. The question is whether we can find in our own midst and in our own hearts that leadership of humane purpose that will recognize the terrible truths of our existence. We must admit the vanity of our false distinctions among men and learn to find our own advancement in the search for the advancement of others. We must admit in ourselves that our own children's future cannot be built on the misfortunes of others. We must recognize that this short life can neither be ennobled or enriched by hatred or revenge. Our lives on this planet are too short and the work to be done too great to let this spirit flourish any longer in our land. Of course we cannot vanquish it with a program, nor with a resolution. But we can perhaps remember, if only for a time, that those who live with us are our brothers, that they share with us the same short moment of life; that they seek, as do we, nothing but the chance to live out their lives in purpose and in happiness, winning what satisfaction and fulfillment they can. Surely, this bond of common faith, this bond of common goal, can begin to teach us something. Surely, we can learn, at least, to look at those around us as fellow men, and surely we can begin to work a little harder to bind up the wounds among us and to become in our own hearts brothers and countrymen once again.

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